Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal issues

IREF Europe - Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal issues

Fiscal competition
and economic freedom


IREF - Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal issues
Fiscal competition and economic freedom
https://en.irefeurope.org/360

Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate.

Moreover, friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.

Share this article :

Related contents ...

Problems with Oxfam’s Inequality Report

Donald Trump’s Tax Cuts Show the Importance of Tax Competition


Taxing the web economy

Tax on Robots? Old Wine in new Bottles



Any message or comments?

Show Form

 css js

CLOSE

Monthly newsletter
Receive our publications for free

By continuing browsing our website, you agree with our cookies policy