Taxes

Abstract: This paper surveys possible motivations having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth.

Abstract: Wealth taxes are portrayed as being fair, and a rather painless way to increase funding for strapped government programs. So then, why should we consider wealth taxes? To what extent are these taxes a matter of justice and to what extent are these taxes a matter of economics? Are wealth taxes harmful or helpful to an economy? Are wealth taxes fair obligations belonging to the entrepreneur or unjust claims made by society? To answer these questions we will proceed as follows: First, we will analyze the arguments given to justify wealth taxation.

The model presented in the paper leads us to predict that the level of redistribution will be all the more important where the jurisdictions have been able to shelter themselves…

The median-voter hypothesis has been central to an extensive literature on the relationship between income inequality and public income redistribution. Knowing that the real-world market income distributions are skewed to the right, a majority of individuals earns an income that is strictly lower than the mean; the economic theory of democracy predicts a radical redistribution in favour of the poor and middle class. But a large empirical literature looking at explicit redistributive social transfers shows that it is rather the exception than the norm.

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate.

The system of taxation of corporate profits, introduced in 2000 in Estonia, is unique. Under this system the reinvested profit is not taxed, only the distributed profit is taxed. Thus,…

Abstract: It has been observed that while the respective theoretical merits of fiscal centralisation and decentralisation are debatable, it is even more difficult to empirically assess the degree of centralisation…

Abstract: The idea to compare the fiscal decentralisation and trends in this respect in the European countries is a core for the IREF project. This means that the strict rules of measurement of this complex issue, as fiscal decentralisation is, should be applied to all fiscal systems. Therefore I will follow the description how to generate the index of fiscal decentralisation invented and provided by the prof. Garello and Price . Nevertheless I will also describe and analyze problems which I have met when adopted this scheme into the Polish fiscal system.

Debates on the future of uropean integration usually centre on “what o do next?” Deepening or widening? Or both. The idea that perhaps we have gone far enough is not often explored. One area where it is almost taken for granted that “Europe must progress” is in taxation. Ever since the publication of the PRIMAROLO report much effort has been expended on emulating the OECD on the need to fight “harmful tax competition”.

Abstract : Just as it would be misleading to say that western economies are freemarket economies, it would be far from the truth to say that this region of the world is one in which intense tax competition is taking place. This state of affairs mirrors the opinion prevailing among national as well as European governments and representatives according to which tax competition can be harmful and therefore must be cautiously controlled.