Vivian in Pretty Woman, Tralala in Last Exit to Brooklyn, Fantine in Les Misérables – sex workers are commonly featured in popular culture. Social perceptions of a sex worker’s daily life are inevitably influenced by how sex work is portrayed in fiction. Some of these perceptions turn into stereotypes that are also reflected in policymaking, which often frames sex workers as either vulnerable victims of human trafficking or as drug-addicted survival sex workers. A UK Conservative Party Human Rights Commission’s report, published in 2019, calls for implementation of the so-called ‘Nordic Model’, which makes buying (but not selling) sexual services illegal. In fact, according to leading sex work researchers, occupational reality is a lot more diverse than the report suggests, with many sex workers exercising more economic agency than commonly expected.
Companies & Regulation
Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Uber, Airbnb: these are only few of the numerous companies which have fundamentally changed our lives with new technologies in recent years. While their business models differ, none of the stars come from Europe. Apart from the serial entrepreneurs at Rocket Internet in Berlin, SAP is the only big digital corporation in Germany. Is there a role to play for the EU in the attempts to change this? Yes, there is. However, not by means of new subsidies and detailed regulation, but by keeping markets open.
Edward Altman is professor emeritus at NYU’s Stern School of Business and director of credit and debt market research at the NYU Salomon Center. He is also the creator of the Z-score: a heuristic index to assess the credit worthiness (and likeliness to default) of companies. The Z-score is built as a weighted sum of commonly available corporate indexes of liquidity, reinvested resources, profitability, and market capitalisation vs liabilities (here the formula). As a scoring system, it does not originate from a precise theory. Rather, it is rooted in common sense, and parameters are calibrated until they generate some useful statistical regularity. For example, for public manufacturing companies, if Z scores higher than 2.99 then the company is not likely to default; if Z scores lower than 1.81 then the risk of default is considerable.
Five years ago, a US American hedge fund bought the distribution rights for Daraprim, a drug to cure AIDS. Overnight, the price went from $13.50 to $750.00. This price increase caused huge public outrage. Yet, high prices for pharmaceuticals are rather common in the US. No other healthcare system around the world spends as much on drugs. Partly responsible for this is the seldom used bargaining power of public insurance programmes on the one hand and, on the other hand, the market power of pharmaceutical firms caused by patents and licensing procedures.
N26, Celonis and Biontech are the most recent success stories of the German start-up scene. All three enterprises have collected higher sums of venture capital in the past year. As good as this news may be, however, the overall picture of the German venture capital scene is rather problematic. Young German enterprises receive comparatively little risk capital.
The recent decision of the German Bundestag against the introduction of an opt out solution for organ donation has surprised many people. After all, the two leading health politicians of the coalition, CDU Health Minister Jens Spahn and SPD Health politician Karl Lauterbach, had publicly supported the opt out solution. In the vote on organ donation, however, the usual party discipline did not apply.
According to Article 38 of the German Constitution, the members of parliament “… are not bound to orders and instructions and are only subject to their conscience.” In practice, however, before a decision is made in the Bundestag, votes are taken in the respective parliamentary groups, and MPs usually follow this result. Parliamentary group discipline is also laid down in coalition agreements.
What influences the voting behaviour of members of parliament? Do they follow their own preferences, the party’s line, the whispers of interest groups or do they listen to their voters? In the latest IREF Working Paper, David Stadelmann of the University of Bayreuth and Gustavo Torrens of Indiana University examine the question of how strong the influence of different groups on political decisions is, exploiting unique data from Switzerland
Some time ago, the story of Martin Shkreli, an entrepreneur who made the news as a candidate for “the most hated man in America” (thus the BBC), caused a stir: he bought the intellectual property rights needed to produce a life-saving anti-AIDS drug, and immediately afterwards raised the price by 5,000%.
Beyond the merits of the affair, what caused the most stir was the unapologetic attitude of this businessman, who did not care about the criticism of moralists and defended his right to maximize profits for himself and the investors of his hedge fund in a contemptuous manner.
The recently updated European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, commonly abbreviated as MiFID II, is supposed to enhance consumers’ protection. Adjustments of regulatory background questions aside, the EU aims to improve “protection of investors by prohibiting the acceptance of commissions, protecting independent consulting, introducing new regulations regarding product monitoring”. This intention seems laudable, especially given the presence of some black sheep among investment advisors. However, a well-meaning policy is not necessarily also good for consumers. While the providers of financial services now legally safeguard themselves using elaborate documentation, clients do not necessarily receive better guidance. In fact, extensive documentation could possibly scare customers off.
Summer is not only the season of swimming trunks and barbecues, but also of vociferous politicians. One of the warhorses of this year’s silly season are bans. Whether it is plastic cutlery, oil heating or domestic flights, calls for bans are becoming louder across the political spectrum. Bans, however, are usually not the best way to deal with negative externalities. Politicians can find calling for bans attractive regardless, provided the requested prohibitions match the preferences of their voters, or signal serious engagement. Moreover, by resorting to extreme positions policymakers try to expand their power and authority. Yet, although the demand for bans is frequently used as an instrument to gain votes, we maintain that the state should actually use them only on rare occasions.