As tax revenues are flooding into the Treasury, the German taxpayers’ association (BdSt) has asked the federal government to axe the “stealth” tax increases and to cut spending further. Current estimates show that tax revenues will be substantially higher than previously thought: a record 600 billion euros in 2012 and 700 billion euros in 2017.
The BdSt considers that some 27 billion euros could be saved in the federal budget.
Until now, the debt crisis seemed to spare the biggest European economy. But the country everybody is relying on starts to meet difficulties to refund its debt. The sale of German benchmark bonds on Wednesday turned to a disaster and the Bundesbank has been forced to hold on to record amounts (39% of the €6 billion Germany had hoped to sell) to ensure the auction did not fail. However, this is not so surprising if one takes a look on German 10-year real bond yield that turns to be negative:
Germany has raised over a quarter of its total EFSF obligation of €211 billion by way of what is essentially magic. The Telegraph reports that “Germany is €55bn richer than…
As we have reported here in last year’s IREF Yearbook on taxation, the German government that has been newly elected in autumn 2009 did have plans for a comprehensive tax reform. These plans included the introduction of an income tax schedule with stepwise increasing marginal tax rates, and possibly only three rates of 10, 25 and 35 percent. There had already been some doubts last year that a majority for such an ambitious reform could be organized. And indeed, the conservative-liberal federal government was characterized by almost complete fiscal policy inertia in its first months.
Like in most European economies, public debt in Germany is characterized by a secular upward trend. There are reasons to believe that the current trend is not sustainable. The ratio of debt to GDP is expected to reach 76,5 percent this year (Deutsche Bundesbank 2010), which implies a ratio that is more than doubled since 1980. Looking at the time-series since the mid-1970s (e.g. Sachverständigenrat 2009, p. 373), one can infer that the responsibility for this long-term increase falls both to the federal and state governments, with the impact of the former being about three times as large as the impact of the latter. One can also infer that, after the Keynesian fiscal policy experiments in the 1970s, the debt-to-GDP ratio stagnated for much of the 1980s, and increased again in the early 1990s following the German re-unification. Following periods of stagnation are then punctuated by the end of the internet bubble at the beginning of the last decade, and by the recession following the most recent financial crisis.
Abstract: In this article, German federalism is analyzed through its implications for public spending and for public revenue. The structure of government spending and taxation has evolved in the direction of greater centralisation. This tendency reveals itself (1) in the constitutional changes with regard to taxation, (2) the major territorial reforms and (3) in the increased influence of the federal state on the public spending of inferior levels of government. The evening out between authorities is too egalitarian and the effects on economic development are nefarious.
