Taxes

What is the current state of public finance in the EU countries? How did the various governments reacted to the crisis which developed in the second half of 2008? To what extent did it trigger a change in tax policy? IREF has asked scholars and experts from fifteen different EU countries to present and evaluate the 2008 tax policies of their respective countries.

Taxation and Justice : A classical Liberal Perspective – Petra Orogvanyiova

From taxation to Justice – Pierre Bessard

Taxation and Justice – Daniel Pellerin

Taxation and Economic Growth: Reconciling Intuition and Theory – Dalibor Rohá?

Taxation, Individual Incentives and Economic Growth – Alex Robson

Introduction by Pierre Garello, Director of the Research Department of IREF

We already knew what the general situation and trends are in the EU. Namely, that the EU- 27 is still the region of the world with the highest fiscal burden, that situations differ greatly among EU member states (with new member countries having lower fiscal burden) and that some trends can be found in the evolution of the tax-mix with, for instance, a weak tendency to replace corporate income tax and labour tax with consumption tax. The reports presented here give life to those statistics. They reveal what were the priorities and constraints of the government in each country?

France’s Draft 2010 Finance Bill provides for the abolition of the Business Tax, which is perceived by local communities and currently accounts for 10% of their revenues. Called by François Mitterrand “the idiot tax”, the Business Tax is the main local tax, paid every year by nearly 2,9 mln of companies. It is based on the investment in equipment done by local firms (the basis of the tax is the rental value of a company’s tangible fixed assets) plus 1.5% tax on the value added for companies with a turnover exceeding 7.5 mln €.

Abstract: This paper surveys possible motivations having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth.

Abstract: Wealth taxes are portrayed as being fair, and a rather painless way to increase funding for strapped government programs. So then, why should we consider wealth taxes? To what extent are these taxes a matter of justice and to what extent are these taxes a matter of economics? Are wealth taxes harmful or helpful to an economy? Are wealth taxes fair obligations belonging to the entrepreneur or unjust claims made by society? To answer these questions we will proceed as follows: First, we will analyze the arguments given to justify wealth taxation.

The model presented in the paper leads us to predict that the level of redistribution will be all the more important where the jurisdictions have been able to shelter themselves…

The median-voter hypothesis has been central to an extensive literature on the relationship between income inequality and public income redistribution. Knowing that the real-world market income distributions are skewed to the right, a majority of individuals earns an income that is strictly lower than the mean; the economic theory of democracy predicts a radical redistribution in favour of the poor and middle class. But a large empirical literature looking at explicit redistributive social transfers shows that it is rather the exception than the norm.

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate.