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Five years ago, a US American hedge fund bought the distribution rights for Daraprim, a drug to cure AIDS. Overnight, the price went from $13.50 to $750.00. This price increase caused huge public outrage. Yet, high prices for pharmaceuticals are rather common in the US. No other healthcare system around the world spends as much on drugs. Partly responsible for this is the seldom used bargaining power of public insurance programmes on the one hand and, on the other hand, the market power of pharmaceutical firms caused by patents and licensing procedures.

The economic consequences of Covid-19 will be heavy: a significant portion of production came to a halt for weeks, and international value chains were disrupted. Governments will increase expenditure massively in order to hand out subsidies and respond to unemployment, while tax revenues will decline. The upshot is that budget deficits will grow, and so will public indebtedness. The European Central Bank (ECB) will make it possible by buying government bonds (govies) and injecting new liquidity, with which commercial banks will also buy (more or less) risky govies, hoping to sell them to the ECB. But a great deal of incremental debt will not be AAA-rated, so portfolio risks follow. The need for increasing the supply of low-risk bond (see Lagarde in 2019) has therefore intensified (see here and here).

Ever since concerns were first voiced in Germany about the Bundesbank’s exposure to the Eurosystem’s payment and settlement system known as TARGET2, the Bundesbank itself has sought to assuage such concerns. In its March 2011 Monthly Report , the Bundesbank accepted that TARGET exposures constitute risks, but sought to play them down as “risks associated with the Eurosystem’s liquidity supply”. The Report reassured the reader that even if a Eurozone central bank were to default, an actual loss would only arise if the collateral such bank had posted failed to cover the exposure, and even if there was such a shortfall, the “cost of such loss would be shared among the national [central] banks”. The Bundesbank’s view on this subject obviously carries weight. With a net claim of 919 billion euros as at end April 2020, it is the largest creditor of TARGET2.

The next elections to the German Bundestag have been moved up to autumn 2021. At that moment, Angela Merkel will have served as chancellor for 16 years. As opposed to Helmut Kohl in the 1990s, she does not seek re-election. Nevertheless, her tenure – which has been extraordinarily long for a head of government in a Western democracy – justifies some thoughts about the pros and cons of changing political leaders at regular intervals.

IREF is a free-market oriented think tank. It promotes ideas, events, and academic research. With regard to research, IREF supports original projects that lead to the production of papers of academic quality of at least 7,000 words. This support is not a prize to published work, nor is it an encouragement to “work in progress”.

According to a recent representative survey conducted by Der Spiegel, a majority in Germany does not consider the country’s income distribution to be fair. 47.3 percent of the respondents consider the income distribution to be „definitely not fair“ and for 27.5 percent it is „rather not fair“. Only 4.4 percent perceive it as „definitely fair“ and 12.5 percent as „rather fair“. However, is the observed income inequality really unfair? And, what degree of inequality would be fair? An IREF Working Paper by Pablo Duarte tackles these questions empirically.

ECB President Lagarde announced a keenly awaited new policy statement on April 30th. There was to be no increase to the Euros 750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), but the economic deterioration of member states would be closely watched and, if necessary, the size of the programme would be adjusted in the future. She further endorsed the proposed new euros 1 trillion Recovery Fund which is supposed to take the pressure off the ECB in supporting member states’ efforts to rebuild virus hit economies. Media reported that the ECB was ‘keeping its powder dry’.

Last February, this website hosted an article titled «The unintended consequences of coronavirus». At the time the article was published, the situation was not at all dramatic in Europe. For example, the official Covid-19 figures in Italy and Germany mentioned very limited number of cases. Governments were confident that everything would be under control, as witnessed by the fact that on February 15, two tons of medical equipment were shipped to China.

The literature has put forward two main arguments to explain the recent rise of populist parties and their electoral success. On the one hand, commentators have highlighted the rising level of uncertainty about the economy and grievances among the losers in global markets. Resentment, it is argued, has been susceptible to the anti-establishment message of populist movements and parties that blames ‘Them’ for taking away from “Us” prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’. On the other hand, authors have emphasised the role of culture and the backlash against long-term shifts in progressive and liberal social values. Such cultural backlash is especially strong among the older generation and less educated people, who suffer the displacement of familiar traditional norms and the rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies. Other external shocks – such as the massive recent increase in immigration – are related to both explanations. Immigrants ‘compete’ against native low-wage, unskilled workers, and at the same time bring with them new values and behaviours that may be source of tensions with the residents in the destination countries.

The damages caused to individuals and businesses by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic are so vast that it will be almost impossible to make an accurate estimate of them. However, if those who contributed to such destruction can be called to account for it, by way of civil liability, the injured parties will obtain justice, and the damaging economic consequences will fall on those responsible. Instead, if internalizing the damage proves impossible, the deadweight loss will remain in the hands of entirely blameless victims.